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THE RESTORATION OF IN RE WINSHIP: A 
COMMENT ON BURDENS OF PERSUASION 
IN CRIMINAL CASES AFTER 
PATTERSON v. NEW YORK 
Ronald J. Allen* 
I. FROM Winship TO Patterson 
At the conclusion of its last term, the Supreme Court rendered 
what should have been a most unremarkable decision. In Patterson 
v. New York,1 -the Court upheld New York's affirmative defense of 
extreme emotional disturbance, 2 which requires a defendant who 
seeks to reduce his offense from murder to manslaughter to prove 
by a preponderance of the evidence that he acted under extreme 
emotional disturbance. 3 Had the case come before the Court seven 
years earlier, it could have been swiftly dispatched with a brief 
opinion upholding the New York statute on the grounds that the issue 
of extreme emotional disturbance does not arise until the state proves 
beyond a reasonable doubt the "essential elements" of the crime-
intent and causation4-and that "extreme emotional disturbance" is 
but a slightly modified version of the defense of provocation, for 
which many states had long placed the burden of proof upon the 
defendant. 5 
* Associate Professor of Law, Faculty of Law and Jurisprudence, State Univer-
sity of New York at Buffalo. B.S. 1970, Marshall University; J.D. 1973, The Uni-
versity of Michigan. 
1. 432 U.S. 197 (1977). 
2. N.Y. PENAL LAW§ 125.15(1)(a) (McKinney 1975). In New York, when an 
"affirmative defense" is raised at trial, the defendant has the burden of establishing 
it by a preponderance of the evidence. N.Y. PENAL LAW § 25.00(2) (McKinney 
1975). 
3. In this Article, the phrase "affirmative defense" refers to a fact for which the 
defendant bears the burden of persuasion and that, if proved, reduces the severity of 
an offense. Similarly, the phrase "burden of proor• and its derivatives will refer 
solely to the burden of persuasion. For the distinction between the burden of per-
suasion and the burden of production, see McCORMICK'S HANDBOOK OF TilE LAW OF 
EVIDENCE§ 336 (2d ed. E. Cleary 1972). 
4. N.Y. PENALLAw § 125.25(1) (McKinney 1975). 
5. See Rhay v. Browder, 342 F.2d 345, 349 (1965) ("We know of no case that 
holds that a defendant is deprived of due process by a rule . . . that shifts to a de-
fendant either the burden of going forward or the burden of proof as to an issue 
brought into the case as an element of the defense when the state has made out a 
prima facie case."). 
New York adopted its affirmative defense of extreme emotional disturbance from 
30 
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Unfortunately, two intervening Supreme Court opinions pre-
cluded such summary treatment and made what should have been 
a most unremarkable decision quite r1/markable indeed. The first 
is Justice Brennan's opinion for the Court in In re Winship, 6 which 
held that adjudications of juvenile delinquency must employ the 
reasonable doubt standard. Justice Brennan could have reached this 
result without disturbing the conventional understanding of affirma-
tive defenses. Instead, he provided the impetus for the Court's 
foray into this area by enthusiastically embracing at the conclusion 
of the first part of his opinion the reasonable doubt standard as a 
constitutional requirement: "Lest there remain any doubt," Justice 
Brennan wrote, "we explicitly hold that the Due Process Clause pro-
tects the accused against conviction except upon proof beyond a rea-
sonable doubt of every fact necessary to constitute the crime with 
which he is charged."7 
Clearly, this assertion did not express the holding of Winship, 
at least not according to any traditional meaning of "holding."8 In-
deed, Winship was largely viewed as confirming the existing state 
of affairs9-a state of affairs in which every jurisdiction employed 
the reasonable doubt standard in criminal adjudications, with- only 
those exceptions explicitly provided for by statute or the common 
law.10 Yet that understanding of Winship was seemingly disap-
the MODEL PENAL CODE § 201.3(b). The Code drafters conceived of extreme emo-
tional disturbance as broader than the traditional concept of provocation. MODEL 
PENAL CODE § 201.3,(b), Comment l (Tent. Draft No. 9, 1959). The Code, how-
ever, does not put the burden of persuasion on the defendant. 
6. 397 U.S. 358 (1970). 
7. 397 U.S. at 364. Earlier in the opinion, 397 U.S. at 363, Brennan quoted a 
similar assertion from Davis v. United States, 160 U.S. 469, 493 (1895): "No man 
should be deprived of his life under the forms of law unless the jurors who try him 
are able, upon their consciences, to say that the evidence before them . • . is suffi-
cient to show beyond a reasonable doubt the existence of every fact necessary to con-
stitute the crime charged." Later courts, however, interpreted Davis as not establish-
ing a constitutional rule. See note 36 infra. 
8. Winship did not present the question whether "every fact necessary to con-
stitute the crime" need be proven beyond reasonable doubt, and resolution of this is-
sue was not essential to the Court's decision. The case raised the question whether a 
"conviction" could be obtained upon proof only by a preponderance of the evidence. 
See 397 U.S. at 359. Winship and the distinction between these two questions are 
discussed in section II infra. 
I am assuming that Justice Brennan's statement did not mean to endorse the "ele-
ments test." See text at notes 70-74 infra. 
9. See Allen, Mullaney v. Wilbur, the Supreme Court, and the Substantive Crim-
inal Law-An Examination of the Limits of Legitimate Intervention, 55 TEXAS L. 
REv. 269, 270 n.10 (1977). 
10. Morano, A Reexamination of the Development of the Reasonable ,Doubt 
Rule, 55 B.U.L. REv. 507, 519-27 (1975). See also Fletcher, Two Kinds of Legal 
32 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 76:30 
proved in Mullaney v. Wilbur, 11 the second case that preceded the 
surprising decision in Patterson. 
In Mullaney, the Court, speaking through Justice Powell, 
invoked Winship to strike down Maine's affirmative defense of pro-
vocation 12 on the ground that requiring the defendant to prove 
provocation by a preponderance of the evidence violated Winship's 
requirement that the state prove beyond a reasonable doubt "every 
fact necessary to constitute the crime." Since Maine had chosen to 
distinguish p:mrder from manslaughter on the basis of provocation, 
said Justice Powell, absence of provocation is a necessary element 
of murder, and, consequently, the state must prove it beyond reason-
able doubt once the issue is properly raised.13 
The most striking aspect of Justice Powell's opinion in Mullaney 
was its rejection of Maine's statutory classifications, a rejection all 
the more remarkable since it involved a traditional affirmative de-
fense. By looking beyond the "form" of a statutory scheme and con-
centrating on its "substance" to determine what facts constituted the 
crime, 14 Justice Powell's opinion seemed to provide the low~r federal 
courts with yet another portal for intervening into areas generally 
thought to be the primary concern of the states. To make matters 
worse, Justice Powell provided no easily recognizable limits to ·this 
newly discovered power to meddle with the burden of proof in state 
criminal cases, for although the holding of the case was clear enough 
Rules: A Comparative Study of Burden-of-Persuasion Practices in Criminal Cases, 
77 YALE L.J. 880 (1968). 
11. 421 U.S. 684 (1975). The history of the Mullaney litigation is detailed in 
Comment, The Constitutionality of the Common Law Presumption of Malice ill 
Maine, 54 B.U.L. REV. 973 (1974). 
12. Maine courts have not referred to provocation as an affirmative defense, but 
there is little doubt about its nature. See text at notes 94-100 infra. 
In Mullaney, the defendant Wilbur claimed to have been provoked by the victim's 
homosexual advance upon him. 421 U.S. at 685. 
13. 421 U.S. at 703-04. The penultimate sentence in the Court's opinion in• 
tiniates that the state may require the defendant to raise the issue of provocation. 421 
U.S. at 704. 
14. 421 U.S. at 698-99. Reference to Maine's statutory treatment of homicide 
or provocation refers to the Maine statutes as interpreted by the Maine courts. The 
defendant in Mullaney was convicted under MB. REv. STAT, tit. 17, § 2651 (1965), 
which provided: "Whoever unlawfully kills a human being with malice aforethought, 
either express or implied, is guilty of murder and shall be punished by imprisonment 
for life." The manslaughter statute, MB. REV. SrAT. tit. 17, § 2551 (1965), read 
in relevant part: "Whoever unlawfully kills a human being in the heat of passion, 
on sudden provocation, without express or implied malice aforethought . . • shall be 
punished by a fine of not more than $1,000 or by imprisonment for not more than 
20 years .... " ' 
The Maine cases construing these statutes are discussed in Comment, Due ProcesJ 
and Supremacy as Foundations for the Adequacy Rule: The Remains of Federalism 
After Wilbur v. Mullaney, 26 ME. L. REv. 37 (1974), 
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-"the Due Process Clause requires the prosecution to prove beyond 
a reasonable doubt the absence of the heat of passion on sudden 
provocation when the issue is properly presented in a homicide 
case"15-just how Justice Powell reached that conclusion was not.16 
At first blush Justice Powell's theory does seem clear enough: 
placing the burden of proof of an affirmative defense on the defen-
dant undermines the interests protected by Winship's requirement of 
proof of guilt beyond reasonable doubt.17 But Justice Powell- failed 
to explain why Winship is not satisfied if the prosecution proves be-
yond reasonable doubt the factual issues raised by the relevant stat-
ute or case law where these facts alone sustain a conviction for the 
more serious offense. He failed, in short, -to construct a bridge from 
the interests noted in Winship to the issue presented by Mullaney. 
Similarly, the significance of his brief overview of the history of 
provocation in the law of homicide is elusive.18 One can read this 
portion of the opinion, as he later did read it in his dissenting opinion 
in Patterson, as an effort to qualify the Winship rule by limiting it 
to those factors that historically have "made a substantial difference 
in punishment of the offender and in the stigma associated with the 
conviction."10 Yet, just why history is so crucial to the constitution-
ality of an affirmative defense is left unsaid. 20 
15. 421 U.S. at 704. 
16. For example, compare Allen, supra note 9, with Tushnet, Constitutional 
Limitation of Substantive Criminal Law: An Examination of the Meaning of 
Mullaney v. Wilbur, 55 B.U.L. REV. 775 (1975), and Comment, Unburdening the 
Criminal Defendant: Mullaney v. Wilbur and the Reasonable Doubt Standard, 11 
HARV. C.R.-C.L.L. REV. 390 (1976). 
17. 421 U.S. at 698. 
18. Justice Powell asserted that "[o]ur analysis may be illuminated if this issue 
[whether the Maine rule requiring the defendant to prove that he was provoked ac-
cords with due process] is placed in historical context." 421 U.S. at 692. According 
to Justice Powell, review of the treatment of provocation in the law of homicide "es-
tablishes two important points": 
First, . . . the presence or absence of the heat of passion on sudden provocation 
. . . has been, almost from the inception of the common law of homicide, the 
single most important factor in determining the degree of culpability attaching 
to an unlawful homicide. And, second, the clear trend has been toward re-
quiring the prosecution to bear the ultimate burden of proving this fact. 
421 U.S. at 696. Yet, Justice Powell does not return to this review later in the opin-
ion. 
19. 432 U.S. at 226. 
20. Justice Powell's position-set forth clearly in his dissenting opinion in Patter-
son, see 432 U.S. at 216-32-that states should be required to prove beyond reason• 
able doubt only those factors that make, and have historically made, a significant 
difference in punishment and stigma is difficult to justify. Even if his first proposi-
tion is accepted, what is there that makes historical analysis-his second proposi-
tion-assume such importance? If a state could constitutionally disregard a factor 
that long has made "a substantial difference in punishment and stigma," as he appar-
ently assumes it could, .then why is the middle ground-shifting the burden-im-
34 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 76:30 
Notwithstanding Justice Powell's belated attempt in his dissent 
in Patterson to remedy some of the inadequacies of his opinion in 
Mullaney, the earlier case had clearly appeared to herald the end 
of affirmative defenses in the criminal law. For all its ambiguous 
reasoning, Mullaney did suggest that the basic constitutional defect 
of Maine's statutory scheme was that it drew a distinction between 
murder and manslaughter "while refusing to require the prosecution 
to establish beyond a reasonable doubt the fact upon which it 
turns."21 And if Mullaney rested on the principle that the state may 
not distinguish between offenses without requiring the prosecution 
to "establish beyond a reasonable doubt the fact upon which [the 
distinction] turns," then it is difficult to see how any affirmative de-
fense could survive Mullaney. If the defendant could not be re-
quired to "establish" ,the "distinction" between murder and man-
slaughter, how could the state require him, for example, to establish 
the equally important distinction between an act done with or with-
out justification, 22 or the distinction between armed robbery with or 
without a loaded gun,23 or the distinction between an act done while 
legally sane or insane?24 
permissible? Moreover, why does the Constitution, as Justice Powell suggested, dis• 
tinguish between factors substantially affecting punishment of ancient and recent 
origin? Why is a defendant treated unfairly if a state provides for the affirmative 
defense of provocation, which may significantly mitigate punishment, but is treated 
fairly if a state provides for the affirmative defense of ignorance of fact to a rape 
prosecution, see, e.g., N.Y. PENAL LAw §§ 1 30.10, .35 (McKinney 1975); WASH. 
REv. C.ODE ANN. § 9.79.160(2) (1977), that may have just as great an impact? 
Justice Powell provided no answers to these questions. 
In fact, I have barely scratched the surface of the problems found in Justice 
Powell's dissenting opinion in Patterson. One could reasonably inquire, for example, 
why the dissenters would rely on history to determine those factors that are within 
their analysis but not look to history to see where the burden of proof for those 
factors has traditionally been placed. One could also point out possible inconsisten• 
cies--such as the assertion that Winship and Mullaney involved only procedure and 
not substance, which is followed by the statement that those cases forbid a state "to 
mask substantive policy choices by shifts in the burden of persuasion." 432 U.S. 
at 228 n.13. One might also ask what difference it makes to the Supreme Court 
how a state makes those policy choices it is permitted to make, and what evidence 
Justice Powell can marshal to support his unadorned assertion that "[t]he political 
check on potentially harsh legislative action is . . . more likely to operate" if his view 
is embraced. 432 U.S. at 228 n.13. Finally, one might decry the willingness to mis• 
read cases in order to support the argument. See the discussion of United States v. 
Romano, 382 U.S. 136 (1965), in 432 U.S. at 228 n.13 (Powell, J., dissenting). 
21. 421 U.S. at 698. 
22. See, e.g., N.Y. PENAL LAw § 40.00(1) (McKinney 1975). 
23. See, e.g., N.Y. PENAL LAw § 160.15 (McKinney 1975), upheld in People v. 
Felder, 39 App. Div. 2d 373, 334 N.Y.S.2d 992 (1972), affd., 32 N.Y.2d 747, 297 
N.E.2d 522,344 N.Y.S.2d 643, appeal dismissed, 414 U.S. 948 (1973). 
24. See, e.g., DE+. CODE tit. 11, §§ 304, 401 (1975), upheld in Rivera v. State, 
- Del.-, 351 A.2d 561, appeal dismissed, 429 U.S. 877 (1976). 
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The wide-ranging potential of Mullaney's reading of Winship 
was quickly seen by commentators25 and courts. 26 The commenta-
tors generally had difficulty seeing how Mullaney could, or why it 
should, be contained, 27 and the courts, although commendably more 
cautious in their applications of Mullaney to the specific facts before 
them, began to invalidate various allocations of burdens of persuasion 
to defendants. 28 The stage seemed set, in short, for the eventual 
elimination of affirmative defenses from the criminal law. 29 But 
then came Patterson v. New York. 30 
Patterson involved the constitutionality of New York's homicide 
scheme, which is functionally equivalent to the Maine provisions at 
issue in Mullaney. 31 In light of the decisions in Mullaney and, to 
25. Mullaney quickly generated an extensive commentary. In addition to the 
works already cited in notes 9, 11, 14 & 16 supra, see Osenbaugh, The Constitu-
tionality of Affirmative Defenses to Criminal Charges, 29 ARK. L. REv. 429 (1976); 
Comment, Constitutionality of Affirmative Defenses in the Texas Penal Code, 28 
BAYLOR L. REV. 120 (1976); Comment, The Burden of Proof and the Insanity De-
fense After Mullaney v. Wilbur, 28 ME. L. REV. 435 (1977); Comment, Affirmative 
Defenses in Ohio After Mullaney v. Wilbur, 36 OHIO ST. L.J. 828 (1975); Note, The 
New York Penal Law's Affirmative Defenses After Mullaney v. Wilbur, 21 SYRACUSE 
L. R.Ev. 834 (1976); Note, State v. Evans-A Frontal Attack on the Common Law 
of Murder, 6 U. BALT. L. REV. 95 (1976); Note, Buzynski v. Oliver: Allocation of 
the Burden of Persuasion for the Insanity Defense, 63 VA. L. REV. 147 (1977). See 
also Note, The Constitutionality of Statutes Permitting Increased Sentences for 
Habitual or Dangerous Criminals, 89 HARV. L. REv. 356 (1975), an excellent piece. 
26. See, e.g., Grace v. Hopper, 425 F. Supp. 1355 (M:D. Ga. 1977); State v. 
Roberts, 88 Wash. 2d 337, 562 P.2d 1259 (1977); cases cited in Allen, supra note 
9, at 275 n.13. 
21. But see Allen, supra note 9; Tushnet, supra note 16. 
28. For decisions invalidating affirmative defenses, see cases cited in note 26 
supra. For examples of commendable caution, see Buzynski v. Oliver, 538 F.2d 6 
(1st Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 984 (1976) (upholding affirmative defense of in-
sanity); Rodriguez v. Smith, 428 F. Supp. 892 (S.D.N.Y. 1977) (upholding affirma-
tive defense of renunciation of attempted crime). For two recent burden of per-
suasion cases written after Patterson that rest on statutory or common-law grounds, 
see Batson v. State, 568 P.2d 973 (Alaska 1977); State v. Humphries, 51 Ohio St. 
2d 95, 364 N.E.2d 1354 (1977). 
29. With the possible exception of insanity. See Mullaney, 421 U.S. at 704-06 
(Rehnquist, J., concurring). 
30. 432 U.S. 197 (1977). 
31. Patterson was convicted under N.Y. PENAL LAw § 125.25 (McKinney 1975), 
which provides in relevant part: 
A person is guilty of murder in the second degree when: 
•1. With intent to cause the death of another person, he causes the death of 
such person or of a third person; except that in any prosecution under this 
subdivision, it is an affirmative defense that: 
(a) The defendant acted under the influence of extreme emotional dis-
turbance for which there was a reasonable explanation or excuse . • •• 
N.Y. PENAL LAW § 125.20 (McKinney 1975) provides in relevant part: 
A person is guilty of manslaughter in the first degree when: 
2.' \vith intent to cause the death of another person, he causes the death 
of such person or of a third person under circumstances which do not con-
36 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 76:30 
a lesser extent, in Winship, Patterson should have been a simple per 
curiam reversal of the New York Court of Appeals' decision sustain-
ing the statute. Instead, the Supreme Court upheld the New York 
statute, with Justice White writing an opinion for the majority that 
reads, for the most part, as though Mullaney had never occurred. 
To confuse matters further, when Justice White finally turned his 
attention to Mullaney he attempted to distinguish rather than over-
rule it, even though the earlier portions of his opinion point . quite 
clearly in the opposite direction. 32 
Thus, we are now in the rather interesting position of having two 
Supreme Court decisions written within two years of on~ another on 
functionally identical statutes, one striking down and the other up-
holding the statutory scheme. Needless to say, this creates some un-
certainty as to what "the law" is in this area. In this Article I intend 
to analyze that uncertainty and provide a coherent theory that justi-
fies as well as llinits the federal interest in the reasonable doubt stan-
dard. 33 In support of this effort I will also examine Patterson's at-
tempt to distinguish Mullaney, for I think that attempt may yield some 
insights into the Court's view of the relationship between affirma-
tive defenses and presumptions in the criminal law.34 
Il. THE FEDERAL INTEREST ·IN THE REASONABLE 
DoUBT STANDARD: THE "RESTORATION" OF Winship 
In his dissent in Patterson, Justice Powell accused the Court of 
"drain[ingl In re Winship ... of much of its .vitality."35 Justice 
Powell was wrong. Patterson did not "drain Winship of its vitality"; 
stitute murder because he acts under the influence of extreme emotional 
disturbance, as defined in paragraph (a) of subdivision one of section 125.25. 
The fact that homicide was committed under the influence of extreme emo-
tional disturbance constitutes a mitigating circumstance reducing murder to 
manslaughter in the first degree and need not be proved in any prosecution 
initiated under this subdivision. 
Patterson claimed to have been provoked upon seeing his estranged wife in a "state 
of semiundress" in the presence of the victim. 432 U.S. at 198. 
The congruence between the Maine and New York statutes is noted in Patterson, 
432 U.S. at 220, 227, and Osenbaugh, supra note 25, at 447-48. 
32. See section III infra. The New York Court of Appeals' distinction between 
Mullaney and Patterson rested on a misunderstanding of Maine law. The New York 
court believed that Maine, unlike New York, did not requir~ the state to prove in-
tent. People v. Patterson, 39 N.Y.2d 288, 313, 347 N.E.2d 898, 907, 383 N.Y.S.2d 
573, 582 (1976). See Allen, supra note 9, at 300 n.145. 
33. See section II infra. I will not discuss burdens of proof of preliminarY ques-
tions of fact. For such a discussion, see generally Saltzburg, Standards of Proof and 
Preliminary Questions of Fact, 21 STAN. L. REV. 271 (1975). 
34. See section III infra. 
35. 432 U.S. at 216. 
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rather, it rejected Mullaney's extension of Winship beyond the 
latter's legitimate boundaries, and thus it restored Winship to its orig-
inal purpose. Careful examination of these three cases shows not 
only that Patterson rightly rejected the due process analysis employed 
in Mullaney, but also indicates the proper scope of the federal inter-
est in the reasonable doubt standard. 
Winship was the first Supreme Court decision to hold explicitly 
that the reasonable doubt standard possesses constitutional dimen-
sions. 36 Since no state had ever allowed criminal conviction on less 
than proof beyond reasonable doubt, 37 with a qualified exception for 
affirmative defenses, 38 the Court had never been called upon to im-
pose the reasonable doubt standard as a constitutional mandate. 30 
l~deed, Winship itself was not a criminal case but a juvenile delin-
quency proceeding, and the Court's discussion of the role of the 
reasonable doubt standard in criminal cases was simply pre1iminary 
to its application of the ruling of In re (_Jault, 40 which provided that 
the states must observe in juvenile delinquency proceedings certain 
elements of due process associated with criminal trials. The Court 
concluded that the reasonable doubt standard was one of the proce-
dures required in both settings, and thus New York's blanket use 
of a lesser standard of proof could not stand. 41 
The Court reached its conclusion in Winship concerning the due 
36. On several occasions, the Court has expressed in dictum that the Constitution 
requires proof beyond a reasonable doubt in criminal cases. See cases cited in Win-
ship, 397 U.S. at 362. The- one case prior to Winship that might have been read 
as holding that the Constitution requires proof beyond a reasonable doubt is Davis 
v. United States, 160 U.S. 469 (1895), in which the Court stated that the prosecution 
in a criminal case must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant was sane 
when he committed the offense. Davis involved a federal prosecution, and the decis-
ion was generally regarded as applying only to federal criminal procedure. See, e.g., 
People v. Allender, 117 Cal. 81, 48 P. 1014 .(1897). In Leland v. Oregon, 343 U.S. 
790, 797' (1952), the Supreme Court peremptorily concluded that Davis "obviously 
establishes no constitutional doctrine, but only the rule to be followed in federal 
courts," and upheld the constitutionality of state statutes requiring the defendant to 
prove insanity beyond a reasonable doubt. 
The Court in Davis cited no constitutional or statutory authority for its position, 
but did draw sustenance from the practice of seven states and the District of Colum-
bia. 160 U.S. at 488-92. The Court appears to have reasoned that, as a matter of 
general principle, mental capacity is an element of murder, if not all criminal of-
fenses, and the prosecution must prove beyond a reasonable doubt "the existence of 
every fact necessary to constitute the crime charged." 160 U.S. at 488, 493. Pre-
sumably, Davis is now to be regarded as an exercise of the Court's supervisory 
authority over federal courts. See Leland, 343 U.S. at 798-99. 
37. See generally Morano, supra note 10. 
38. Fletcher, supra note 10, at 882-83. 
39. 397 u.s; at 372 (Harlan, J., concurring). 
40. 387 U.S. 1 (1967). 
41. 397 U.S. at 368. 
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process attributes of the reasonable doubt standard by noting that 
the universal acceptance of that standard42 strongly implied its fun-
damental nature or, to put the matter more precisely, strongly im-
plied the necessity of employing the reasonable doubt standard to 
protect a fundamental value. The value protected, as Justice Harlan 
so cogently demonstrated in his concurrence, is the policy of pre-
ferring errors benefiting the accused over those favoring the prosecu-
tion. The Court then supplemented its analysis by articulating the 
interests that this value preference protects-principally the ac-
cused's interest in liberty and his good name-in order to demon-
strate that they were of sufficient magnitude to justify including the 
procedure safeguarding them among the elements of due process. 43 
In the second part of its opinion, the Court dealt with the state's ar-
gument that juvenile proceedings are civil rather than criminal in 
nature. The Court rejected this contention, and its reasoning is 
critical to a proper understanding of Winship. The Court simply was 
not convinced that juvenile delinquency proceedings could be distin-
guished meaningfully from criminal proceedings, at least not in any 
way relevant to burdens of proof, 44 and thus it quite sensibly refused 
to allow due process adjudication to be controlled by labels. Ac-
cordingly, the states were forbidden from withdrawing a procedure 
that admittedly served values and interests of constitutional dimen-
sion from a hearing in which those interests were at stake in a fashion 
hardly distinguishable from a criminal trial, even though New York 
was :qot the only state where juvenile delinquency trials masqueraded 
as "civil proceedings."45 
42. 397 U.S. at 361-63. 
43. 397 U.S. at 372 (Harlan, J., concurring). The majority did recognize that 
the reasonable doubt standard implements the policy of minimizing the risk of erro-
neous convictions. 397 U.S. at 362-63. 
Obviously, the extent of the historical or the present-day commitment to a prac-
tice does not necessarily control due process analysis. Some procedures, such as seat-
ing the prosecution at the table farthest from the jury during trial, may be nearly 
universal, but are hardly matters of due process. Conversely, some widespread pro-
cedures, such as use of a preponderance standard in juvenile delinquency proceedings, 
violate due process. The paramount issues in due process analysis are the importance 
of the value preserved by the procedure in the system of criminal justice and whether 
the state has adequately protected the interests at stake. History and the practices 
of other jurisdictions are, of course, quite relevant to these determinations and indeed 
may often be the most influential criteria, as Patterson strongly suggests. One should 
be cautious about inf~rring too much concerning due process adjudication from one 
case, however. The discussion in the text, at any rate, is descriptive rather than eval• 
uative. 
44. Cf. McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528 (1971) (jury trial not constitu-
tionally required in juvenile proceedings). 
45. See In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 17 n.22 (1967). 
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The important point to note about the Winship Court's treatment 
of burdens of proof in criminal cases is that the Court's due process 
analysis relied heavily on the common practice in the states and only 
supported the implications of that practice by reference to _the inter-
ests protected. The Court attempted no thorough examination of 
those interests and did not purport to consider fully the states' bur-
den-of-persuasion practices. Indeed, affirmative defenses were 
never even mentioned by the Court. In Mullaney, by contrast, the 
Court reversed its order of reasoning, concentrating first on the inter-
ests protected by the reasonable doubt standard rather than on 
whether Maine's statute "offends some principle of justice so deeply 
rooted in the traditions and conscience of our people as to be ranked 
as fundamental."46 _ This reversal of the analysis in Mullaney was 
the cause of Patterson's subsequent disavowal of Mullaney, for it had 
implications far beyond what Winship could support. 
In Mullaney, the Court noted that the interests protected by the 
reasonable doubt standard are implicated when a state chooses to 
distinguish murder from manslaughter. That is true enough, but 
what the Court failed to note was that these interests are. implicated 
every time a state draws a distinction between offenses by the use 
of an affirmative defense.47 Thus Mullaney, carried to its logical 
extreme, would seem to forbid the use of all affirmative defenses. 
Yet, consider once again the genesis of this analysis in Winship. 
There the Court relied heavily on the existing state of the law in 
order to demonstrate the constitutional interest in the reasonable 
doubt standard. The existing state of the law, however, included 
affirmative defenses. Thus, on the basis of Winship, states should 
indeed be forbidden generally from employing the preponderance 
standard in criminal cases, but, in light of the Court's analysis, should 
they be allowed to employ affirmative defenses in that setting? The 
answer is obviously yes; or if -that is not so obvious, the analytical 
structure of Winship, as distinguished from Justice Brennan's dicta, 
unmistakably provides no basis for the contrary conclusion. 
One can now see more clearly the shift of analysis in Mullaney 
that permitted it to accomplish a result that Winship could not sus-
tain. Mullaney invoked Winship not to invalidate a burden-of-proof 
practice demonstrably inconsistent with the "traditions and con-
science of our people," but instead used that case in a fashion that 
46. This is the standard Patterson purports to apply. See 432 U.S. at 201-02 
(quoting Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 523 (11958) ). 
47. Consider 18 U.S.C. § 3575 (1970) (habitual offender status provable by pre-
ponderance of the evidence). 
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would provide the means to invalidate a practice long accepted 
throughout the country. Thus Mullaney, which purported to "apply" 
Winship, drastically altered that case from one that looks to tradi-
tional practice and prevailing usage by the states to aid in due 
process analysis to one that frees the federal courts to impose their 
own view about the appropriate use of the reasonable doubt standard 
on the states notwithstanding widely shared views to the contrary. 
Moreover, this result was apparently to be allowed even though two 
crucial aspects of Winship_ were absent-the states had not eviscer-
ated the prosecution's burden such that "innocents" were not pro-
tected against erroneous convictions, and there had been no attempt 
to subjugate analysis to the facade of a labeling process. It is this 
overextension of Winship by Mullaney that the Court clearly wished 
to condemn in Patterson: 
Long before Winship, the universal rule in this country was 
that the prosecution must prove guilt beyond reasonable doubt. 
At the same time, the long-accepted rule was that it was constitu-
tionally permissible to provide that various affirmative defenses 
were to be proved by the defendant. This did not lead to such 
abuses or to such widespread redefinition of crime and reduction of 
the ·prosecution's burden that a new constitutional rule was re-
quired. This was not the problem to which Winship was ad-
dressed.48 
Thus, one significant aspect of Patterson is, in short, the restoration 
of Winship to its original purpose and the concomitant refusal to per-
mit Winship to be misconstrued and then employed as the basis for 
unjustifiable extensions of federal authority. 49 
Merely noting the effect of Patterson is inadequate for my 
purposes, -however, for quite possibly the erroneous decision is 
Patterson rather than Mullaney. This possibility is made evident by 
reconsidering what it means to protect "innocent" defendants by the 
reasonable doubt standard. I asserted above that affirmative defen-
ses do not enhance the likelihood of erroneous convictions since the 
prosecution must meet its burden for the designated elements of the 
crime before an affirmative defense ever becomes relevant. Yet 
what does it mean to protect against "erroneous convictions"? If 
it means simply that the prosecution must establish enough to justify 
48. 432 U.S. at 211 (footnote omitted). 
49. Interestingly, the trend in the states has been toward making lack of provoca-
tion an element of the prosecution's case. 432 U.S. at 211. The Court could 
have emphasized this fact in order to uphold the result in Mullaney, That it did 
not do so indicates to me that the Court's primary concern was disavowing Mul-
laney's general thrust. 
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a conviction, then my assertion is indisputable. If, on the other 
hand, it means that the prosecution must establish each fact that 
bears on an accused's culpability or sentence, then my assertion is 
in error. Whenever a defendant fails to establish an affirmative de-
fense, the possibility is presented that, had the prosecution been re-
quired to disprove the defense beyond reasonable doubt, the trier 
of fact would have either convicted the defendant of a lesser offense 
or acquitted altogether. This would result, of course, in exposing 
the defendant to a lesser punishment or no punishment at all. Af-
firmative defenses, in short, undeniably affect the interests articu-
lated in Winship. Thus, to determine which case--Patterson or 
Mullaney-was decided correctly, the analysis must proceed to an 
examination of the interests thought to be protected by the reason-
able doubt standard. That examination will demonstrate, I think, 
that the interests articulated in Winship and employed in Mullaney 
cannot reasonably justify the implications of the latter case, although 
those interests, as implicitly accommodated in Patterson, do indicate 
the extent of the federal interest in the reasonable doubt standard. 
Winship amculated three interests that the reasonable doubt 
standard tends to protect-the community's confidence in the 
criminal law, the defendant's interest in avoiding unwarranted stig-
matization, and his interest in being free from unjustified loss of lib-
erty. 50 This list has apparently been considerably shortened by Pat-
terson. Neither the majority nor the dissent in Patterson made any 
reference to the community confidence notion, presumably because 
the Court now recognizes that insofar as this interest does more than 
reiterate the defendant's interest in avoiding undeserved punish-
ment, it is a concern of the states, not the federal government. 51 
The matter of stigmatization, also omitted from the majority's 
analysis, parallels the deprivation of liberty and hence does not re-
quire separate treatment. 52 In short, the interests informing due 
50. 397 U.S. at 363-64. The Court mentioned that the reasonable doubt stand-
ard also protects against erroneous convictions, but the concern with error is due to 
the presence of the interests mentioned in the text. It has no independent analytical 
significance. 
51. See Allen, supra note 9, at 279-81. 
52. ld. at 281-83. In his dissent in Patterson, Justice Powell referred three times 
to the defendant's interest in avoiding undeserved stigmatization, 432 U.S. at 226, 
228, for the purpose of asserting that Mullaney proscribed only affirmative defenses 
that result in a major difference in loss of liberty and stigmatization. Given the un-
certainties in measuring stigmatization, it is questionable whether, in Justice Powell's 
view, a difference in this variable alone would invalidate an affirmative defense. 
Presumably, the stigma he had in mind is an intuitive notion of how much obloquy 
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process analysis of the reasonable doubt standard under the Consti-
tution can be reduced to the defendant's liberty interest. 58 
Mullaney insisted that the determination of which of two related 
offenses the defendant has committed affects his constitutional lib-
erty interest no less than the judgment of guilt or innocence. 64 Un-
deniably, the presence or absence of the mitigating factor may have 
a substantial impact on the severity of the punishment a convicted 
defendant receives. As Mullaney pointed out, the added punish-
ment may be more burdensome than the whole punishment imposed 
for some lesser offenses. 65 Yet, one cannot jump from this fact io 
the conclusion that requiring the prosecutor to prove the distinguish-
ing factor beyond a reasonable doubt serves the due process inter-
est. Assuming that the punishment for the higher offense is valid, 
given what the prosecution must prove beyond a reasonable doubt, 
the allocation of the persuasion burden of the mitigating factor has 
no bearing on whether the defendant suffers what the Constitution 
considers undeserved punishment. Thus, the interest served by the 
due process requirement of proof beyond reasonable doubt is un-
affected by thp outcome of cases like Mullaney. 
An example may help to clarify this argument. Consider a state 
with an intentional homicide statute that punishes every intentional 
homicide with thirty-years' imprisonment; if the state proves that the 
defendant intentionally killed the victim, then a flat sentence of 
thirty years is imposed regardless of the presence of any mitigating 
factor. Assume that such a statute is constitutional. Now, consider 
the effect on the constitutionality of that statute of simply adding to 
it a provision that no more than twenty years of imprisonment may 
be imposed if the defendant proves by a preponderance of the evi-
dence that he acted under the influence of extreme emotional dis-
turbance. If the constitutional interest in the reasonable doubt 
standard centers on liberty deprivation, how can the addition of a 
chance to mitigate a constitutional punishment invalidate the statute? 
Or, to put it another way, if a state may constitutionally imprison 
all intentional murderers for thirty years by proving beyond reason-
able doubt only intent and causation, then whatever liberty interest 
is associated with different offenses. See Allen, supra note 9, at 281-83; note 53 
infra. 
53. I am excluding the unlikely case where the only purpose of a criminal trial 
is to stigmatize. Cf. Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693 (1976) (reputation alone is not 
"liberty" or "property" within the due process clause). 
54. 421 U.S. at 698. 
55. 421 U.S. at 698-. 
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the defendant constitutionally possesses in the context of homicide 
prosecutions surely is fully accommodated by such a statute. How, 
then, can the addition of a mitigating circumstance in the form of 
an affirmative defense-a factor that reduces punishment-possibly 
violate the already fully accommodated interest?56 
Patterson appears on close inspection to have adopted this line 
of reasoning, although how the Court in Patterson treated an ac-
cused's liberty interest is not, to say the least, without ambiguity. 
Justice White's opinion alludes to several different arguments that 
conceivably could be used to articulate the federal interest in the 
reasonable doubt standard, but the opinion fails to elaborate upon 
any of them. Only one of the Court's allusions makes sense, 
however. 57 It is contained in the following passage of the opinion: 
The Due Process Clause, as we see it, does not put New York 
to the choice of abandoning [affirmative] defenses or undertaking 
to disprove their existence in order to convict of a crime which 
otherwise is within its constitutional powers to sanction by sub-
stantial punishment. 58 
The key to this passage is the word "otherwise." What the Court 
is saying, I think, is that if a state may "otherwise" impose a particu-
lar sentence on the basis of what the state has proven beyond a 
reasonable doubt, then permitting a defendant to reduce the sen-
tence he receives below the permissible level through proof of an 
affirmative defense is constitutional. 59 
If the Court now subscribes to this theory-sometimes referred 
to as the theory that "the greater includes the lesser"60-the analysis 
56. See generally Christie & Pye, Presumptions and Assumptions in the Criminal 
Law: Another View, 1970 DUKE L.J. 919. Note that if the thirty-year sentence 
were changed to life, this hypothetical would represent the statutes at issue in Mul-
laney and Patterson. 
57. Alternative conceptions of the constitutional standards applicable to affirma-
tive defenses are discussed in text at notes 68-80 infra. 
58. 432 U.S. at 207-08. 
59. For a related discussion, see Allen, supra note 9, at 284-301. 
60. One author has recently disputed the implications of ''the greater includes the 
lesser" notion. Underwood, The Thumb on the Scales of Justice: Burdens of Per-
suasion in Criminal Cases, 86 YALE L.J. 1299 (1977). Professor Underwood does 
not attempt to rebut the force of "the greater includes the lesser" with respect to pun-
ishment and stigma, perhaps in recognition of the difficulty of the task. Rather, her 
Article attempts to articulate constitutional interests that override "the greater in-
cludes the lesser" thesis. See generally Allen, supra note 9, at 290. 
Professor Underwood's argument is flawed in a number of respects. She main-
tains, for example, that an undifferentiated reasonable doubt rule is needed to offset 
jury bias against defendants. Underwood, supra at 1306-07. Unfortunately, she pre-
sents no evidence that juries are biased, and the only authority she cites for that 
proposition is Goldstein, The State and the Accused: Balance of Advantage in Crim-
inal Procedure, 69 YALE L.J. 1149, 1149-53 (1960), who does not even mention the 
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possibility. In fact, Professor Goldstein points out that juries, "[b]y refusing to • , • 
find defendants guilty, . • . succeeded in considerable part in forcing a redress of the 
imbalance in favor of the state." Id. at 1152. That is hardly a ringing affirmation 
of the point Professor Underwood was attempting to support. Professor Underwood 
also ignores the many expressions of faith, apparently as well grounded as her lack 
of faith, in the attempt by most juries to do their duty as instructed by the judge. 
See, e.g., R. I..EMPERT & s. SALTZBURG, A MODERN APPROACH TO EVIDENCE 1148 
(1977). This is not to say, of course, that jurors are unaware of the very significant 
probability that the accused before them is guilty. But it is to say that there is little 
evidence to support Professor Underwood's position that juries do not generally de• 
cide cases on the basis of the evidence adduced by objectively evaluating the evidence 
and employing the relevant standard of proof as they understand it. Professor 
Underwood's reliance on jury bias is, in short, clearly inadequate to justify the con-
stitutional doctrine she espouses. 
Professor Underwood's remaining argument on behalf of Mullaney suffers from 
serious infirmities as well, for not only does she rely on unfounded empirical asser-
tions, but also she fails to present a tenable rationale for her conclusion. In essence, 
Professor Underwood argues that affirmative defenses are unconstitutional because 
they "ten[d] to deny citizens the fair notice that is constitutionally required of the 
criminal law." Underwood, supra at 1324. This purported obscurity of a shift in 
the persuasion burden, Underwood argues, is dangerous on two accounts. First, an 
unwary individual may engage in certain conduct, rightfully thinking it is legal, only 
to discover that he cannot sustain a burden of persuasion on a factual issue dis-
tinguishing his conduct from related, illegal conduct. Had he known of the alloca~ 
tion of the burden of proof, the argument runs, he might not have engaged in the con• 
duct notwithstanding its legality. Id. at 1324. Second, the affirmative defense may 
enable the legislature to deceive the public about its substantive policy choices and 
thereby avoid public scrutiny of its actions. Id. at 1318. 
This position contains several questionable assumptions. For one, Underwood as-
sumes that the public is generally less informed about procedural, as opposed to sub-
stantive, law. There may be some intuitive truth to this proposition. Cf. Fletcher, 
Two Kinds of Legal Rules: A Comparative Study of Burden-of-Persuasion Practices 
in Criminal Cases, 77 YALE L.J. 880, 880-94 (1968) ("[t]he burden of persuasion has 
proved to be a subtle, low-visibility tool for adjusting the interest of competing classes 
of litigants"). Still, Underwood fails to document the crucial point-that there is 
a significant differential in the public's understanding of substantive and procedural 
rules-and she even acknowledges that "popular understanding of the substantive law 
is notoriously deficient." Underwood, supra at 1324. Similarly, Professor Under-
wood's apparent belief that the citizenry would substantially modify its behavior to 
accommodate burden of proof rules is, to say the least, hardly a self-evident proposi-
tion. 
Professor Underwood further assumes that legislatures commonly employ affirma-
tive defenses in order to "repeal" substantive rules inconspicuously. Id. at 13119. She 
refers to no empirical support for this assumption; indeed, it is hard to imagine how 
$ere could be such evidence. She downgrades the possibility that the legislature's' 
adoption of an affirmative defense may reflect a compromise of legitimate differ-
ences of opinion about the wisdom of the defense or a willingness to extend a benefit 
to the defendant without burdening the prosecutor. 
Professor Underwood's unadorned empirical assertions are troubling, for nowhere 
does she point to a specific constitutional provision or doctrine as the source of a 
prohibition against affirmative defenses. Thus, her argument must stand or fall on 
the strength of the assertion that affirmative defenses tend to deny citizens fair notice 
of the criminal law. The public may take little note of procedural developments, but 
in the absence of persuasive evidence that the public has a much sounder grasp of 
substantive law, how can one claim that a constitutional prohibition of affirmative 
defenses is justified in order to preserve public oversight of the criminal law and to 
protect the populace from being misled concerning the content of the criminal law? 
Such a demonstration, I might add, would be difficult to make. Professor Under-
wood's position is based primarily on her view that the substantive criminal law is 
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of the constitutionality of an affirmative defense must proceed to . 
another level. One must ask whether the greater punishment-the 
punishment authorized in the event the defendant fails to establish 
less subtle than burden of proof analysis and thus it is reasonable to assume that 
the public will better understand the substantive criminal law. Id. at 1324. Al-
though she is surely correct in some instances, I venture to say that the "subtleties 
of rules of proof" are a whole lot less "subtle" than the law of theft in most jurisdic-
tions, and even less subtle still than such arcane areas as mistake of law and fact 
or causation. At any rate, due process provides some protection against deceptive 
criminal legislation by requiring clarity in the definition of offenses. In the absence 
of proved abuses, it is unclear why the Constitution should demand more. 
Professor Underwood's concluding defensive argument against the "greater in-
cludes the lesser" principle-a parade of horribles-is no more persuasive than her 
effort to derive a constitutional doctrine that affirmatively overrides the principle. 
She contends that, if the states can exempt certain defenses from the reasonable doubt 
rule, they can eliminate other procedural protections, such as the right to coun-
sel, for that defense. Id. at 1329-30. This argument fundamentally misconceives 
the "greater includes the lesser" principle in the context of affirmative defenses. 
This principle maintains simply that if the purpose of the reasonable doubt rule is 
to protect a defendant's constitutional interest in liberty, the rule is satisfied if the 
basic statute fully protects that constitutional interest. Accordingly, states should 
then be permitted to allocate burdens of proof to defendants on factors that will miti-
gate punishment because the impact of the proof of the factor on the defendant's 
liberty is not of constitutional magnitude-the constitutional interest has already been 
secured. See also Schick v. Reed, 419 U.S. 256 (1974). · 
Other procedural protections, such as the right to counsel, involve constitutional 
interests other than liberty, however. The inability of the uninitiated to investigate, 
to marshal and adduce evidence, to make effective presentations, and to work withip. 
a complex procedural system give rise to a concern for rationality in the decision-
making process that is independent of the accused's interests in liberty. Without the 
aid of a trained advocate, the defendant may be unable to present his case in an effec-
tive manner. Consequently, the jury may be unable ·to appreciate the strength of the 
defendant's case. or the weakness of the prosecution's and the rationality of its decis-
ionmaking process may suffer accordingly. See, e.g., Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 
458,465 (1938); Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 69 (1932). 
Admittedly, we desire rational decisionmaking in part because the defendant's 
liberty interests are at stake. Nonetheless, we also insist on rationality in order to 
preserve the legitimacy of the criminal process as a means of enforcing social values. 
Thus, we have a distinct interest in rationality, and procedures designed to further 
that goal can easily be distinguished from burden-of-proof requirements. More im-
portant, however, even if we value rationality in a criminal proceeding solely for the 
benefit of the defendant, we can _distinguish the burden of proof from other pro-
cedural safeguards. Burdens of proof do not enhance the rationality of the decision-
making process. Rather, they simply allocate the risk of errors to one party or the 
other. Thus, even if liberty interests underlie both the right to counsel and the rea-
sonable doubt rule, the two protections are not necessarily coextensive. The right 
to counsel can be seen as furthering a rational determination of whatever factual ele-
ments are present in a case, and the reasonable doubt standard can be seen as protect-
ing an individual's eighth amendment liberty interests by placing the risk of error 
on the prosecution for those factors necessary to justify the potential sentence. An-
alogous arguments can be constructed for each of the procedural protections guar-
anteed by the Constitution. 
Finally, if we do not w~h to view the Constitution's procedural protections as 
serving independent concerns from burdens of proof, then Professor· Underwood is 
correct-states could limit those procedural protections to elements of the offense 
made necessary by the eighth amendment. 
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the affirmative defense-is constitutional. To answer that question, 
one must tum to the eighth amendment. 
Through most of the nineteenth century, the eighth amendment 
was thought to forbid only rather hideous punishments, 61 but within 
the last century the cruel and unusual punishment clause has been 
interpreted to require a rough proportionality between· the culpabif.'. 
ity of an offense and the punishment that is imposed. 62 This re-
quirement of proportionality provides the method of testing the ac-
curacy of the assumption found in my hypothetical, and it also pro-
vides the means of delineating the extent of the federal interest in 
the reasonabl~ doubt standard. If the courts conclude that a given 
punishment is not disproportional to what the state has proved be-
yond reasonable doubt63 notwithstanding the presence or absence of 
any mitigating factors, then a defendant's liberty interest would obvi-
ously be satisfied by a statute that required proof of only those ele-
ments and that imposed that particular punishment. Accordingly, 
the mere addition to that statute of an affirmative defense, which 
after all could constitutionally be ignored, should be equally satisfac-
tory. The import of the proportionality principle is, then, that the 
state should be required to prove enough to justify the imposition 
of . the maximum sentence permissible under the statute. 64 Once 
that is accomplished, the accused has been fully protected against 
an unwarranted deprivation of liberty, and the state should be per-
mitted to elaborate on the basic statute as it sees fit. 
61. See Wheeler, Toward a Theory of Limited Punishment: An Examination of 
the Eighth Amendment, 24 STAN. L. REV. 838, 838-45 (1972). 
62. Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349 (1910). So far, Weems is the only 
case in which the Supreme Court has applied the proportionality doctrine. Wheeler, 
supra note 61, at 857-58. The doctrine has been applied by several lower federal 
and state courts. See cases cited in Comment, The Eighth Amendment, Becarria, and 
the Enlightenment: An Historical Justification for the Weems v. United States Ex-
cessive Punishment Doctrine, 24 BUFFALO L. REV. 783, 832-33 (1975). See also 
Griffin v. Warden, 517 F.2d 756 (4th Cir. 1975). 
63. For example, in Mullaney the COurt could have ruled that life imprisonment 
is too harsh a sentence for an intentional homicide when provocation is present. 
Thus, the states would have had a choice between reducing the sentence for intentional 
homicide and proving beyond a reasonable doubt the absence of provocation. Alter-
natively, the Court could have ruled, as in the death penalty cases, that life im-
prisonment for intentional homicide is too severe without consideration of some 
aggravating and mitigating factors, whether or not provocation has constitutional 
status. See Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976); Woodson v. North Carolina, 
428 U.S. 280 (1976). The administration of the proportionality doctrine is discussed 
in some detail in Allen, supra note 9, at 297-300. 
64. In light of the Patterson decision, I suspect that federal courts will look at 
the particular sentence given in a case rather than at the maximum sentence allowed 
by the statute. This approach would result in fewer decisions invalidating a sentence. 
Nevertheless, from a systemic perspective, it makes more sense to consider the maxi-
mum sentence. See Allen, supra note 9, at 299 n.143. 
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The thesis that due process requires proof beyond a reasonable 
doubt only with respect to those elements of the offense that are 
"essential" by virtue of the eighth amendment concretely expresses 
the role of the reasonable doubt standard. 65 It thus clarifies the 
dimensions of the Constitution's solicitude for the "transcendent 
value" of liberty-the ambiguous phrase often invoked in constitu-
tional burden-of-proof adjudication as though it explained the re-
sult. 66 Together, due process and the eighth amendment protect 
criminal defendants from unwarranted deprivations of liberty by 
requiring the state to establish sufficient factual elements to justify 
the allotted punishment and by requiring the state, in establishing 
those elements, to minimize .the risk of error adverse to the de-
fendant. Once the overriding constitutional command is satisfied, 
however, the need for the protective procedure is likewise satisfied, 
and the traditional state power should be able to reassert itself, per-
mitting the states to allocate burdens of proof as they desire. 
In addition to failing to provide cognizable constitutional stan-
dards, the unadorned rhetoric of "transcendent values" provides 
little assurance that the results reached in cases invoking it are 
constitutionally required. One of the compelling attributes of the 
proportionality theory is that it cures this deficiency by tying the 
federal constitutional mandate to a relatively unambiguous con-
stitutional command that has the further advantage of leaving the 
states substantially free to fashion their own policies. 67 Moreover, 
65. There is widespread belief that employing the reasonable doubt standard makes 
it more difficult to convict the factually innocent at the expense of making it more 
difficult to convict the factually guilty. See In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 368-72 
(1970) (Harlan, J., concurring); Kaplan, Decision Theory and the Factfinding Proc-
ess, 20 SrAN. L REv. 1065 (1968). Whether the reasonable doubt standard actually 
has this effect, however, is as of yet unproven. See the jury studies cited in Under-
wood, supra note 60, at 1308-11; see also C. McCoRMICK, HANDBOOK OF THE I..A.w 
OF EVIDENCE 686 (1954). If, for example, there were no factually innocent defen-
dants who, after all the evidence had been presented, would be within the gap between 
the preponderance and the reasonable doubt standard, then requiring the prosecution 
to meet the higher standard would serve solely to "protect" factually guilty people. 
Even if my extreme example is not an accurate reflection of reality, which I doubt it 
is, the basic point is nonetheless true. Without knowing the distribution of guilt prob-
abilities of factually innocent and guilty defendants, we cannot know the actual ef-
fect of choosing one standard of proof over another. The problem is compounded, 
of course, by our inability to make accurate estimates of the probability of guilt, 
which explains the futility of attempting to define what a "reasonable doubt" is. 
66. See, e.g., Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 525-26 (1958). 
67. In this regard the proportionality. theory can profitably be compared to the 
theory espoused in Underwood, supra note 60, which does not distinguish policy 
from constitutional command and which permits-indeed, invites-the federal courts 
to impose their view of wise policy on the states. This view of constitutional inter-
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it does so in such a way as to reconcile Winship and Patterson while 
concomitantly demonstrating the errors of Mullaney. Winship, it is 
now clear, merely articulated what a state must do if a factor is a 
necessary elemep.t of the offense as defined by law. Patterson, by 
contrast, provides the method to determine whether a state's defini-
tion of a crime is constitutionally permissible. Mullaney erred 
in failing to inquire whether there are limits to thei federal con-
cern in the accused's liberty and reputational interests and whether 
the markedly different setting of Mullaney, as compared to Winship, 
was of any constitutional significance. Patterson rectified these 
errors, if it is viewed as embracing the proportionality concept, by 
making clear that although the interests articulated in Winship are 
of great importance, standing alone they are inadequate to prohibit 
a state's allocation ·of the burden of proof that otherwise is constitu-
tional. Patterson makes clear, in other words, to what extent the 
factors present in. Winship but absent in Mullaney are relevant to 
due process adjudication in this area and to what extent the ac-
cused's liberty and reputational interests are independently signifi-
cant. 
Relating crime to its punishment and viewing :the relationship 
from the perspective of the eighth amendment provides, in sum, a 
coherent theory that both justifies and delimits the federal interest 
in the reasonable doubt standard. Morever, it does so in a way 
far superior to other theories for federal intervention. 
As Patterson indicated, there are two other principal theories of 
the constitutional standards applicable to affirmative defenses that 
compete with the ,proportionality theory----the "elements" theory and 
the "political compromise" theory. 68 The "elements" theory stipu-
lates that the state must prove beyond reasonable doubt whatever 
factual issues it labels an element of the offense. A component of 
this theory is the "physicaj. location" rule, a rule of statutory construc-
tion providing that a particular factual issue is an element of an of-
fense only if it is incorporated into the text of the basic statute de-
scribing the offense. 00 
pretation probably explains Professor Underwood's failure to examine carefully 
whether an analysis that ties the burden of persuasion to the Constitution's relevant 
s~bstantive command-the eighth amendment-is more acceptable than concluding 
that the federal courts are justified in imposing an undifferentiated reasonable doubt 
requirement on the states in the absence of an explicit constitutional provision man-
dating that result. 
. 68. For a consideration of possible explanations of Mullaney v. Wilbur that are 
mdependent of Patterson, see Allen, supra note 9, and authorities cited therein. 
69. See Osenbaugh, supra note 25, at 437-42. Occasionally a court would em-
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At various points throughout the Patterson opinion the Court 
alluded to the elements test, most explicitly in the statement 
that the Court "will not disturb the balance struck in previous 
cases holding that the Due Process Clause requires the prosecution. 
to prove beyond reasonable doubt all of the elements included in 
the definition. of the offense of which the defendant is charged."70 
Both examples given by the Court of unconstitutional burden shifts 
also tend to support this view. They are situations in which no ele-
ments are included within the definition of the "crime,"71 which may 
suggest that any affirmative defense will be sustained so long as the 
legislature does not drain all substantive content from a crime's 
definition. 
Nevertheless, I doubt that the Court meant to embrace the 
elements test as its criterion. of constitutionality. In the first place, 
the sentence quoted above that alluded to the elements test was fol-
lowed by another that implicitly rejected the test: "Proof of the non-
existence of all affirmative defenses has never been constitutionally 
required; and we perceive no reason to fashion such a rule in this 
case and apply it to the statutory defense at issue here."72 The 
juxtaposition. of these two sentences would have been unnecessary 
if the elements test were to control decision.making. Thus, the 
necessary inference is that there may be "some affirmative defen-
ses," but not "all," whose nonexistence the state will constitutionally 
be required to prove. 
More fundamentally, however, it is difficult to see just what con-
hellish the physical location rule in the following manner: 
In the absence of a statute, the general rule is that the burden is upon the 
state in a criminal case to negative any exception or proviso appearing in that 
part of the statute which defines the crime if the exception is "so incorporated 
with the language describing and defining the offense that the ingredients of 
the offense cannot be accurately and clearly described if the exception is 
omitted .... " 41 Am. Jur. 2d, Indictments and Informations, § 98, pp. 
940-941. 
State v. Segovia, 93 Idaho 208, 210, 457 P.2d 905, 907 (1969). The embellishment 
is of no analytical value, however. Consider 'a circle divided into three parts. If 
one of the parts is removed, can the circle "be accurately and clearly described" with-
out reference to the missing part? It depends on how you look at it, obviously( The 
embellishment, in short, is just another means of .expressing the conclusion that a 
particular factual requirement is or is not an element of an offense .. 
Julius Stone has effectively disposed of any lingering questions concerning the 
logical significance of the physical location rule. See J. STONE, LEGAL SYSTEM AND 
LAWYERS' REAsONINGS 241-43 (1964). 
70. 432 U.S. at 210. See 432 U.S. at 205-06, 211 n.12, 215. 
71. The Court noted that the legislature cannot declare an individual guilty or pre-
sumptively guilty, nor can it declare that the finding of an indictment or proof of 
the identity of the accused shall create a presumption of the existence of all the facts 
essential to guilt. 432 U.S. at 210. 
72. 432 U.S. at 210. 
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stitutional interest is served by the elements theory. The physical 
location rule is obviously an arbitrary means of determining the 
"definition" of an offense. The legislature may wish to "define" an 
offense in one way but define the elements of the prosecution's case 
in another, and either could be considered the "definition" of the 
crime. Why should the validity of a state statute placing the burden 
of proving provocation on the defendant depend on whether the state 
"defines" murder as intent, causation, and no provocation or simply 
as intent and causation?73 Surely Patterson's references to the ele-
ments theory were intended simply to indicate that the elements as 
defined in the statute under review permitted the state to provide 
for the affirmative defense of extreme emotional disturbance. 74 
The second alternative standard that has been proposed for judg-
ing the validity of an · affirmative defense, while somewhat more 
sophisticated than the elements theory, is no more persuasive. This 
is the "political compromise" test, which permits affirmative defenses 
that result from the compromise of competing forces in the legisla-
ture. 75 This test responds to the fear that states may be unwilling 
to provide certain affirmative defenses if they cannot place on the 
defendant the burden of proof for the factual issue created. Com-
mentators have often pointed out that a decision like Mullaney, if 
followed, would be likely to inhibit experimentation with new af-
73. The analysis would, of course, be the same if the burden were allocated by 
judicial decision. 
The existence of an explicit state statute placing the burden of persuasion on the 
defendant would end the question in most states-the statute would be followed. See, 
e.g., State v. Segovia, 93 Idaho 208, 457 P.2d 905 (1969). 
74. The application of the elements theory must be distinguished from statutory 
construction. A federal court may construe a federal statute as expressing Congress' 
desire to require the prosecutor to bear the burden of persuasion on a particular fac-
tual issue. Thus, the court could invalidate a shift or reduction in the burden on 
statutory gymnds. Cf. Tot v. United States, 319 U.S. 463 ·(1943), rejecting the Gov-
ernment's contention that a criminal conviction obtained with the use of an invalid 
statutory presumption could be sustained on the ground that Congress had the power 
to broaden the definition of the crime, thereby eliminating the need for the presump• 
tion. The Court ruled that Congress had plainly chosen to condition a violation of 
the statute on the existence of the inferred fact. For a similar exercise of statutory 
construction, see United States v. Romano, 382 U.S. 136 (1965). 
15. See MODEL PENAL CODE,§ 1.13, Comments (Tent. Draft No. 4, 11955) at 
113; 1 NATIONAL COMMISSION ON REFORM OF FEDERAL CRIMINAL LAWS, WORKING 
PAPERS 19-24 (1970); W. LAFAVE & A. ScOTT, HANDBOOK ON CRIMINAL LAW 49 
(1972), 
The Court's language iq. Patterson did not rely directly on the political compromise 
idea. Given the great scrutiny to which Patterson surely will soon be subjected, how-
ever, I think it useful to read bits and snatches of the opinion for all they are worth. 
In this regard, note the Court's discussion of the possible policy decisions made by the 
New York legislature regarding the recognition and burden of proof of the affirmative 
defense of extreme emotional disturbance. See 432 U.S. at 207. 
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firmative defenses.76 To avoid that harsh irony, the political com-
promise test looks to whether the legislature would have refused to 
adopt the defense but for the provision imposing the burden of proof 
on the defendant. 
Of this theory's many problems, the most disturbing is its para-
doxical quality. It is paradoxical in the sense that if the only justifi-
cation for allowing affirmative defenses is that otherwise the legisla-
ture will be forced to choose between two diametrically opposed but 
constitutional alternatives, then the argument implicitly assumes the 
unconstitutionality of affirmative defenses. Is not the real point, in 
other words, that affirmative defenses are unconstitutional but that 
such a conclusion may result in an unfortunate legislative choice, and 
thus the better tack is to permit an unconstitutional choice as an ex-
pedient? Moreover, the only escape from this logical trap is either 
to assert that political compromise is merely a general consideration 
supporting the validity of affirmative defenses, in which case it pro-
vides no means of distinguishing the permissible from the impermis-
sible defense, or to fashion criteria distinguishing • permissible from 
impermissible grounds of compromise. The latter course presents 
significant difficulties, the most serious of which is that it would re-
quire that the constitutional basis be articulated for whatever ground 
of compromise is thought to be impermissible, and unfortunately 
none of the reasons thought adequate to justify entering the murky 
waters of legislative motivation are present in this context. 77 
The difficulty of constructing from the elements or the political 
compromise theory a coherent basis for constitutional analysis of af-
firmative defenses bolsters the conclusion that the Court has adopted 
the eighth amendment proportionality doctrine. 78 Further evidence 
that Patterson achieves this result may lie in the observation that the 
proportionality doctrine can be administered consistently with the 
practice of the Court in recent years of limiting intrusion by the fed-
eral judiciary into policy areas traditionally reserved for the states. 
Consider once again the passage quoted at the beginning of this 
section: 
76. See the sources cited in note 75 supra. Each of these authorities incorporates, 
to varying degrees, considerations of comparative convenience. See note 78 infra. 
77. See generally Brest, Palmer v. Thompson: An Approach to the Problem of 
Unconstitutional Legislative Motive, 1971 SUP. Cr. REV. 95; Eisenberg, Dispropor-
tionate Impact and Illicit Motive: Theories of Constitutional Adjudication, 52 N.Y. 
U.L. REv. 36 (1977); Ely, Legislative and Administrative Motivation in Constitu-
tional Law, 79 YALE LJ. 1205 (1970). 
78. The Court in Patterson did not invoke considerations of comparative conven-
ience-i.e., whether the state or the defendant could more conveniently bear the 
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The Due Process Clause, as we see it, does not put New York to 
the choice of abandoning [affirmative] defenses or undertaking to 
disprove their' existence in order to convict of a crime which 
otherwise is within its constitutional powers to sanction by sub-
stantial punishment. 79 
Perhaps the last phrase of this quote is a signal to the lower courts 
t}lat they are not to accomplish through applications of the propor~ 
tionality principle what they were beginning to accomplish through 
applications of Mullaney v. Wilbur. Having quite curtly disavowed 
the far-flung implications of Mullaney, the Court surely did not mean 
to substitute an equally wide-ranging eighth amendment analysis. 
Thus, another import of this passage probably is that the lower courts 
are not to engage in a greatly expanded proportionality analysis, and, 
concomitantly, the passage indicates that affirmative defenses in the 
context of serious criminality will not be disturbed except where a 
statute removes from the definition of a crime those elements that 
make it serious in the first place. 80 With respect to crimes of lesser 
significance where the power to punish the offender severely is 
not so clear, the Court may all~w, as lower courts have done on 
their own initiative in regard to disproportionality of sentence, 81 a 
more intensive judicial scrutiny of allocations of burdens. 
Whether _my interpretation of Patterson is correct is uncertain, 
burden of_ proof-to support its position, but it did acknowledge that such concerns 
may influence a state's decision to allocate burdens. See 432 U.S. at 207. This 
is consistent with the Court's uniform refusal to allow comparative convenience no-
tions to influence its judgment on constitutional issues ever since the doctrine was 
first articulated in Morrison v. California, 291 U.S. 82 (1934). Justice White in Pat• 
terson makes explicit reference to Morrison in a lengthy footnote, 432 U.S. at 203 
n.9, but apparently only for the purpose of presenting authority permitting burdens 
of proof to be placed on defendants. That he had no intention to rely on the com• 
parative convenience aspects of Morrison to influence the decision in Patterson is evi• 
dent from the concluding sentence of the footnote: "Of course, if the Morrison cases 
are understood as approving shifting to the defendant the burden of disproving a fact 
necessary to constitute the crime, the result in the first Morrison case [upholding 
a burden shift to defendants] could not coexist with Winship and Mullaney." 
The Court's avoidance of comparative convenience is well justified, for it is not 
possible to discriminate between those circumstances that are encompassed by it 
and those that are not. Compare, for example, proof of insanity to proof of provo-
cation, and compare both of those to proof of intent. Finally, compare those three 
to proof of renunciation or withdrawal. Thus, comparative convenience is one of 
those theories that sounds good but cannot be rationally implemented. 
79. 432 U.S. at 207-08. 
80. As would be the case, for example, if the defense of entrapment or insanity 
were viewed as negating intent. I also have serious difficulty with self-defense as 
an affirmative defense, at least as an affirmative defense to a murder prosecution, 
Compare Commonwealth v. Carbonetto, 455 Pa. 93, 314 A.2d 304 (1974), with State 
v. Millett, 273 A.2d 504 (Me. 1971 ), and State v. Robinson, 47 Ohio St. 2d 103, 351 
N.E.2d 88 (1976). 
81. See, e.g., Downey v. Perini, 518 F.2d 1288. (6th Cir.), vacated and remanded, 
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of course. I realize that my argument may appear to give undue 
weight to a small excerpt from the majority's opinion-after all, 
Patterson makes no explicit reference to the eighth amendment or 
to the proportionality doctrine.82 But the Court's apparent re-
luctance to clarify its position in this area makes speculation neces-
sary, and the proportionality doctrine is the most sensible explanation 
of the federal interest in the reasonable doubt standard, especially 
given the result in Patterson. Relating crime to its punishment and 
viewing it from the perspective of the eighth amendment has a com-
pelling logical force. In addition, the doctrine justifies federal inter-
vention in an area long dominated by the states on the basis of a 
clear constitutional command with relatively determinable limits that 
adequately respect the states' traditional role in fashioning criminal 
law policy. Finally, no other explanation of federal intervention can 
be maintained unless the Court meant to forbid federal court inter-
vention almost entirely. The Court is unmistakably disenchanted 
with Mullaney v. Wilbur and quite possibly means to limit to ~gre-
gious cases the involvement of federal courts in allocating burdens 
under state law. This result, would, in effect, restore the state of 
affairs that existed prior to the decision in Mullaney. Orily time 
will tell whether the Court meant to restore the status quo ante 
or whether it intended to stimulate development of more rigorous 
eighth amendment standards. 
ill. VIEWING Patterson AS DISTINGUISHING, 
RATHER THAN OVERRULING, Mullaney 
My treatment of Mullaney v. Wilbur has been based on the 
423 U.S. 993 •(1975); Hart v. Coiner, 483 F.2d 136 (4th Cir. 1973); Davis v. Zah-
radnick, 432 F. Supp. 444 (W.D. Va. 1977). 
82. The Court's failure to embrace the proportionality doctrine openly and en-
thusiastically is not surprising. Historically the Court has shown an inclination to 
rely on the eighth amendment in only the extreme case. Thus, if the Court does 
mean to tie the reasonable doubt standard to the eighth amendment, it will be enter-
ing largely uncharted waters. Accordingly, the Court may have chosen to proceed 
cautiously and let the lower courts discover and chart the shoals that lie ahead. This 
will allow an eighth amendment jurisprudence to develop with the Supreme Court 
intervening when it feels it appropriate to do so. For an interesting discussion of 
how the Court has allowed the lower courts to develop the jurisprudence in other 
areas, see Cover & Aleinikoff, Dialectical Federalism: Habeas Corpus and the Court, 
86 YALB L.J. 1035 (1977). 
The proportionality doctrine has already undergone substantial development. See 
Allen, supra note 9, at 297-300. See also Carmona v. Ward, 436 F. Supp. 1153 (S.D. 
N.Y. 1977); People v. Stewart, 400 Mich. 540, 256 N.W.2d 31 (1977). There is 
also a related area that may yield insights for proportionality analysis; a number 
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conclusion that Patterson overruled Mullaney, and so indeed I think 
it did. 83 A majority of the Court purported to see it otherwise, 
however, and Justice White's opinion attempting to distinguish 
Mullaney raises a number of questions about the motives of the 
Court. As I see it, the answers to those questions make it clear that 
the purported distinction yields no insights into the federal interest 
in the reasonable doubt standard. However, the attempt to distin-
guish Mullaney is not without interest for reasons quite removed 
from the burden-of-proof analysis of Patterson. In this section I 
shall first demonstrate that the Maine statute struck down in Mullaney 
is in no significant way different from the one upheld in Patterson, 
thus indicating that the Court's distinction of Mullaney is untenable. 
I shall then speculate on why the court acted as it did and conclude 
with a brief discussion of the implications of the Court's treatment 
of Mullaney. 
In Mullaney, the Court invalidated a Maine statute placing the 
burden on the defendant to prove heat of passion as a result of ade-
quate provocation. In Patterson, the Court sustained a New York 
statute placing the burden on the defendant to prove extreme emo-
tional disturbance. Patterson must surely reject Mullaney's hold-
ing, 84 regardless of what the Court is willing to admit, unless there 
is some distinction of constitutional magnitude between the two stat-
utory schemes. One potential ground for differentiating the two 
laws is the substantive character of the defenses they allow. New 
York's concept of "extreme emotional disturbance," adopted from 
the Model Penal Code, 85 is arguably broader than Maine's concept 
of states permit review of the severity of a sentence. See, e.g., N.Y. CRIM. PROC. 
LAW§§ 450.10, .30 (McKinney 19711); Huff v. State, 568 P.2d 1014 (Alaska 1977). 
83. See, e.g., Farrell v. Czarnetzky, No. 76-2131 ·(2d Cir. Sept. 30, 1977), espe• 
cially Oakes, J ., concurring. 
84. The Court in Mullaney stated: "We therefore hold that the Due Process 
Clause requires the· prosecution to prove beyond a reasonable doubt the absence of 
the heat of passion on sudden provocation when the issue is properly presented in 
a homicide case." 421 U.S. at 704. 
85. MODEL PENAL CoDE § 210.3(1)(b) (Proposed Official Draft, 1962). The 
Code does not place the burden of proof on the defendant, however. 
One of the reasons prompting the draftsmen of the Code to forgo common-law 
terminology was the belief that the common law of provocation had become too nar-
row and too rigid and did not easily accommodate changing perceptions of what 
should serve to mitigate the harshness of a murder prosecution. By reformulating 
the test for mitigation, the draftsmen hoped to avoid arbitrary limitations on the prin-
ciple and to "[sweep] away the rigid rules that have developed with respect to the 
sufficiency of particular types of provocation." MODEL PENAL CODE § 201.3, Com-
mentary (Tent. Draft No. 9, 1959) at 46-47. For a discussion of the rigidity of the 
common-law rules, see W. LAFAVE & A. Scorr, supra note 75, at 472-82. The view 
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of "heat of passion," and the New York law may provide better 
notice of its provisions. Neither of these distinguishing features 
supports a constitutional distinction, however. 
Even if the New York courts interpret their statute broadly, 86 
that hardly distinguishes it for constitutional purposes from the 
Maine statute. The only effect of embracing a broader view is that 
juries will be permitted to hear as evidence regarding mitigation a 
number of provoking circumstances, viewed from the peculiar per-
spective of the defendant, that trial judges would not have permitted 
juries to consider under the old provocation rubric. 87 But we have 
long had great diversity in the administration of the various standards 
of provocation that have developed in the various states, 88 and the 
scope of the defense has always been thought to raise only questions 
of policy. More particularly, there is no relationship, at least that 
I can see, between the scope of the defense and who should bear 
its burden of proof. The former goes to a state's view of what acts 
under what conditions should be treated with leniency, and the latter 
goes to how certain the state wishes to be of the existence of the 
mitigating factors. The two are independent concerns, 89 which 
of the draftsmen of the New York statute is found in N.Y. PENAL LAW § 125.20, 
Commentary at 393 (McKinney 1975). 
Similarly, the draftsmen soughMo "qualify the rigorous objectivity of the prevail-
ing law insofar as it judges the sufficiency of provocation by its effect on the reason-
able man," MODEL PENAL CODE § 201.3 Commentary (Tent. Draft No. 9, 1959) at 
47; see id. at 41, 48, by permitting an expanded inquiry into the peculiar attributes of 
the man in the dock. Whereas before individual circumstances had been ignored, 
the Code anticipated that they would be considered. 
86. There are no thorough analyses of the issue in the New York cases. For 
a general discussion, see People v. Patterson, 39 N.Y.2d 288, 300-01, 347 N.E.2d 898, 
906-07, 383 N.Y.S.2d 573, 581 (1976), affd., 432 U.S. 197 (1977). 
87. As, for example, the old rule that words alone are never sufficient. See 
MODEL PENAL CODE§ 201.3, Commentary (Tent. Draft No. 9, 1959) at 46-47. 
88. See W. LAFAVE & A. Scorr, supra note 75, at 574-79. 
89. Placing the burden of production on the defendant would satisfy comparative 
convenience considerations based on the possibly enhanced difficulty of administering 
a broader statute. Apparently those considerations are not to aid constitutional an-
alysis, however, see note 78 supra, and this area is another example of the good sense 
of that conclusion. Even if the "extreme emotional disturbance" formulation has the 
potential to be the broadest form of provocation, at what point does it become so 
broad that it permits the burden of persuasion to be shifted to the defendant? Bear 
in mind that the states have long administered defenses of varying scope, see W. 
LAFAVE & A. Scorr, supra note 75, at 574-79, and, if comparative convenience were 
to be a factor, a difficult-if not impossible-question of degree would have to be 
resolved. 
Moreover, the breadth of New York's statute is not altogether clear. The same 
common-law process that resulted in the rigidification of the common law of provoca-
tion may result in a similar rigidification of New York's statutory defense, although 
the dearth of cases on the subject may indicate that trial judges are letting about 
everything "go to the jury." In this regard compare State v. Corbin, 15 Ore. App. 
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probably explains the absence in Patterson of any reliance on the 
scope of New York's defense to distinguish it from Maine's. 
The other suggested distinction is more cogent than the issue of 
scope, and it has some oblique support in certain language in Patter-
son. 00 The Court might have distinguished the laws of the two states 
on the ground that New York's provided better notice of its provi-
sions because the affirmative defense was spelled out in the statute, 
whereas Maine's affirmative defense was a judicial gloss on the 
homicide statute, which did not mention provocation at all. The Su-
preme Court, however, has never ruled that the due process vague-
ness doctrine requires the state to prescribe in a statute the contours 
of a criminal offense, and the doctrine that a narrowing construction 
may save an otherwise unconstitutionally vague law is authority to 
the contrary. 91 One does not look, in short, to unadorned statutes 
but to statutes as construed, and the cases construing Maine's law-
at least the recent cases-left no doubt about the meaning of the 
relevant provision. 92 Thus, the clarity of the statute and the re-
quirement of notice do not distinguish Mullaney from Patterson 
unless the Court was disavowing well-established principles of statu-
tory construction of state law, and doing so in the most obscure 
fashion.93 
The other potential ground for distinguishing between the New 
York and Maine laws is the procedural ~ffect of the defense. Justice 
White stood on this ground in arguing that Patterson differed from 
Mullaney in that the Maine law created a statutory presumption 
536,516 P.2d 1314 (1973), with Zebrowski v. State, 50 Wis. 2d 715, 1185 N.W.2d 545 
(1971). 
90. See 432 U.S. at 206-07. 
91. Wainwright v. Stone, 414 U.S. 21 (1973). 
It should also be noted that, in determining the meaning of a statute, "it is well-
established that an authoritative construction by the State's highest court 'puts (appro-
priate) words in the statute as definitely as if it had been so amended by the legis-
lature.'" Patterson, 432 U.S. at 223 n.7 (Powell, J., dissenting) (quoting Winters 
v. New York, 333 U.S. 507, 514 (1948) ). ·For a recent-and extreme-example of 
this doctrine, see Rose v. Locke, 423 U.S. 48 (1975). · 
92. The Maine statute did not mention provocation at all; rather, that defense had 
resulted from a line of cases construing the statute. See Comment, supra note 11, 
at 989-99. 
93. Another factor that corroborates the small likelihood that the Court would 
rely on the notice differential of the two statutes is that the "notice requirement" 
is less a requirement of notice and more a means of reducing the risk of official abuse 
created by a vague statute. See, e.g., Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 
156 (1972). The ideal of actual notice is an appealing standard by which the risk 
of discriminatory enforcement can be tested. A similar dynamic explains why cases 
construing a statute are referred to in a vagueness inquiry even though no one, to 
my knowledge, expects the man on the street to research-or be able to research-
. the precedents. 
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whereas New York's involved a true affirmative defense. Thus, Jus-
tice White read Maine's homicide statute as making the absence of 
provocation an elem~nt of murder, 94 and he reaffirmed the holding 
of Mullaney that due process does not allow a state to shift "the bur-
den of persuasion with respect to a fact which the State deems so 
important that it must be either proved or presumed."95 In contrast, 
under the New York statute, "nothing was presumed or implied 
against Patterson."96 Consequently, in Justice White's view, New 
York had proved beyond a reasonable doubt every element of its 
definition of murder. 
Unfortunately the purported distinctions between presumptions 
and affirmative defenses fail to sustain the contrasting outcomes of 
Mullaney and Patterson. First, the Maine statute, as construed ]:>y 
the Maine courts, did not set up a statutory presumption in the tradi-
tional sense. Justice White depicted Maine law as directing the trial 
judge to instruct the jury that fact C, a necessary element of the ·of-
fense, could be inferred from proof of facts A and B. 97 That, 'of 
course, is not the case. Maine had not provided a rule of evidence 
concerning inferential relationships; instead, it had placed the bur-
den of proving provocation on the defendant,98 precisely as New York 
had done with extreme emotional disturbance. Indeed, if a few words 
are changed, the description of Maine's statute fits New York's per-
fectly. The absence of extreme emotional disturbance is just as 
much a "part of the definition of' murder in New York as provoca-
tion was in Maine. Moreover, New York "presumes" lack of extreme 
emotional disturbance to the same· extent as did Maine. All it meant 
in Maine to presume lack of provocation until the "presumption" was 
"rebutted" by the defendant was that the defendant had the burden 
of proving that he had been provoked. 99 That is precisely the situa-
tion in New York. Still, by characterizing Mullaney as a statutory 
94. 432 U.S. at 215. The Maine statute defining murder, see note 14 supra, 
did not refer to provocation. However, the instructions given by the Maine trial 
court emphasized that "malice aforethought," which is mentioned in the Maine stat-
ute, is inconsistent with the "heat of passion on sudden provocation." Mullaney, 421 
U.S. at 686-87; Patterson, 432 U.S. at 213. It was for this reason_ that the majority 
in Patterson asserted that lack of provocation was an element of murder under the 
statute. 
95. 432 U.S. at 215. 
96. 432 U.S. at 216. 
97. See 432 U.S. at 215-16. 
98. See 432 U.S. at 212-16. 
99. State v. Lafferty, 309 A.2d 647 (Me. 1973); State v. Rollins, 295 A.2d 914 
(Me. 1972); State v. Wilbur, 278 A.2d 139 (Me. 1971). 
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presumption case, the Court could assert that it had no impact on 
garden-variety affirmative defenses where no inferential process is 
involved. This analysis allowed the Court to reach the opposite 
conclusion in Patterson than it reached in Mullaney without having 
to overrule the earlier case.100 
But even apart from this skewed interpretation of Maine law, the 
distinction between a true affirmative defense and a presumption 
lacks constitutional significance. "Presumption" means many differ-
ent things in our legal system, 101 but for purposes of the issues under 
100. It is inconceivable that Justice White did not know exactly what he was 
doing. A year before he wrote for the Court in Patterson, Justice White wrote for 
a unanimous Court in Lavine v. Milne, 424 U.S. 577 (1976), a case that has strik-
ing similarities to the common problem of Mullaney and Patterson. In Lavine, the 
Court considered the_ constitutionality of a statute that "deemed" a person applying 
for, welfare within 75 days after voluntarily terminating his employment or reducing 
his earning capacity to have done so "for the purpose of qualifying for such assistance 
or a larger amount thereof, in the absence of evidence to the contrary supplied by 
such person." N.Y. Soc. SERV. I.Aw § 131(11) (McKinney Supp. 1975). Consider 
the following portion of Justice White's opinion: 
Although the District Court found this [provision] to be an unconstitutional 
"rebuttable presumption," the sole purpose of the provision is to indicate that, 
as with other eligibility requirements, the applicant rather than the State must 
J:Stablish that he did not leave employment for the purpose of qualifying for 
'benefits. The provision carries with it no procedural consequence; it shifts to 
the applicant neither the burden of going forward nor the burden of proof, for 
he appears to carry the burden from the outset. 
The offending sentence could be interpreted as a rather circumlocutory 
direction to welfare authorities to employ a standardized inference that if the 
Home Relief applicant supplies no information on the issue, he will be presumed 
to have quit his job to obtain welfare benefits. However, such an instruction 
would be superfluous for the obvious reason that the failure of an applicant 
to prove an essential element of eligibility will always result in the denial of 
benefits, much as the failure of a tort or contract plaintiff to prove an essential 
element of his case will always result in a nonsuit. The only "rebuttable 
presumption"-if, indeed, it can be so called-at work here is the normal 
assumption that an applicant is not entitled to benefits unless and until he proves 
his eligibility. 
Despite the rebuttable presumption aura that the second sentence of § 
131(11) radiates, it merely makes absolutely clear the fact that the applicant 
bears the burden of proof on this issue, as he does on all others. And since 
appellees do not object to the substantive requirement that Home Relief apJ?Ii• 
cants must be free of the impermissible benefit-seeking motive, their underlymg 
complaint may be that the burden of proof on this issue has been unfairly placed 
on welfare applicants rather than on the State. 
424 U.S. at 583-85 (footnote omitted). 
However "circumlocutory" the Maine statute and cases involved in Mullaney, 
they "merely [made] absolutely clear the fact that the [defendant] bears the burden of 
proof on [the] issue" of provocation. By demonstrating the Court's competence to 
see through the form of a statute to its substance, Lavine seems to force the con-
clusion that the only explanation of Patterson is that the Court wished to reject the 
principle of Mullaney. In fact, Lavine is not an aberration; the Court has long 
recognized that states have often used the word "presumption" and its derivatives in 
a very loose way. See Casey v. United States, 276 U.S. 413, 418 (1928), recognizing 
that "there are presumptions that are not evidence in a proper sense but simply regu-
lations of the burden of proof." 
101. See generally D. LOUISELL, J. KAPLAN & J. WALTZ, CASES AND MATERIALS 
ON EVIDENCE 950-1009 (3d ed. 1976); Soules, Presumptions in Criminal Cases, 20 
BAYLOR L. REV. 277 (1968). 
November 1977] Restoration of Winship 59 
consideration in Mullaney and Patterson it refers to an evidentiary 
rule directing the court to instruct the factfinder that it may infer 
the establishment of one fact from the establishment of another.102 
The presumption rests on a determination by the courts or the legis-
lature that experience demonstrates the validity of the inference 
even though a jury of laymen is unlikely to be aware of it. Thus, 
the presumption cures a gap in the jury's knowledge that otherwise 
could be remedied only by presenting in every case the evidence 
for the validity of the inference. 
Presumptions were originally devised by judges through the 
common law, but in the past century legislatures have displaced the 
courts in this area, and statutory presumptions designed to serve the 
same instructional needs have proliferated.103 The Supreme Court 
has wrestled with the constitutional problems of statutory presump-
tions in a long line of cases.104 What has proved troublesome to 
the Court is that Congress has on occasion created statutory pre-
sumptions providing for the inference of a necessary element even 
though the evidence of a significant correlation between the proved 
facts and the faot inferred is inconclusive.105 The Court has struck 
down these inadequately founded presumptions as violative of due 
process.106 
102. One example is the ancient rule that unexplained possession of stolen goods 
justifies the inference that the person in possession knew the property had been 
stolen. In prosecutions for knowing possession of stolen goods, juries are often in-
formed of this permissible inference through an instruction. See, e.g., Barnes v. 
United States, 412 U.S. 837 (1973). 
103. As the government stated in its brief in United States v. Gainey: "All that 
Congress has done, in effect, is to substitute for judge-made law its statutory views 
of what inferences are normally permissible." Brief for Appellant at 15, United 
States v. Gainey, 380 U.S. 63 (1965). There may be a question whether judges, at 
least federal judges, will be permitted to engage in this lawmaking process in the fu-
ture. Cf. Barnes v. United States, 412 U.S. 837, 846 n.11 (1973) ("[w]e do not de-
cide today whether a judge-formulated inference of less antiquity may properly be 
emphasized by a jury instruction"). The Supreme Court recently dismissed for want 
of a substantial federal question a state case upholding a statutory inference. Hamil-
ton v. Florida, 329 So. 2d 283 (Fla.), appeal dismissed, 429 U.S. 909 (1976). 
104. See Turner v. United States, 396 U.S. 398 (1970); United States v. Gainey, 
380 'U.S. 63 (1965); Tot v. United States, 319 U.S. 463 (1943); Ferry v. Ramsey, 
277 U.S. 88 (1928). 
Somewhat similar problems have arisen with respect to mandatory presumptions 
in civil cases, see, e.g., Heiner v. Donnan, 385 U.S. 312 (1931), although such pre-
sumptions are now viewed as problems distinct from presumptions in criminal cases. 
See generally Ackerman, The Conclusive Presumption Shuffle, 125 U. PA. L. REV. 
761 (1977); Gordon & Tenenbaum, Conclusive Presumption Analysis: The Principle 
of Individual Opportunity, 71 Nw. U.L. REV. 579 (1976). 
105. Relying on the legislature's superior factfinding powers is not inconsistent 
with recognizing that the legislature may occasionally err and that courts should 
rectify the errors. 
106. See, e.g., Turner v. United States, 396 U.S. 398 (1970). The Co_urt has 
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Statutory presumptions and affirmative defenses operate in a 
similar fashion, as Patterson and Mullaney (as misconstrued by the 
Court) make clear. A state could, as New York did, define murder 
as intent and causation and further provide for the affirmative de-
fense of provocation.107 A state could just as easily conclude, as the 
Court did in misinterpreting Maine's law, that lack of provocation 
should be an element of murder but further conclude that lack of pro-
vocation can be inferred from intent and causation. Justice White ap-
parently feels that presumptions and affirmative defenses require 
different constitutional treatment and that a presumption may be in-
valid where the comparable affirmative defense is permitted. But, 
if anything, presumptions should receive lesser scrutiny, for they are 
more favorable to the defendant than are affirmative defenses since 
the former shift only the burden of production whereas -the latter 
shift the burden of persuasion. With a statutory presumption, all 
the defendant must do to rebut it is create a reasonable doubt about 
the issue. Were the state to replace the presumption with an affir-
mative defense, the defendant would have to prove the affirmative 
defense by a preponderance of the evidence. Even where the de-
fendant can offer no evidence on his behalf, he is better off under 
a presumption, since the jury may simply decline to draw the in-
ference.108 When this defendant must establish an affirmative de-
never resolved what the relationship must be between the proven and the inferred 
fact. W. LAFAVE & A. Scorr, supra note 75, at 149. As LaFave and Scott point 
out, however, "it now appears that the Court is testing statutory presumptions by the 
•.. beyond-a-reasonable-doubt test." Id. There is language in Hankerson v. North 
Carolina, 432 U.S. 233 (1977), which suggests that the Court has reacl)ed this con-
clusion: "In Mullaney v. 'Wilbur, as in In re Winship, the Court held that due pro-
cess requires the States in some circumstances to apply the reasonable-doubt standard 
of proof rather than some lesser standard." 432 U.S. at 242. The Court would 
not have· reached the issue of standard of proof demanded of statutory presumptions 
in Mullaney even if the Court had treated it as a statutory presumption case since 
Maine placed the persuasion burden on the defendant and this fact alone would in-
validate the Maine law. 
Not every inference used by the prosecutor in a criminal trial need satisfy the 
reasonable doubt standard, as proof by circumstantial evidence demonstrates. The 
reason advanced for requiring such a high standard when the prosecutor relies on 
a statutory presumption is that the jury will be instructed on the inference, and the 
instruction may have a very great impact on the jury. See, e.g., Bailey v. Alabama, 
219 U.S. 219, 237 (1911); Comment, Statutory Criminal Presumptions: Reconciling 
the Practical with the Sacrosanct, 18 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 157, 160 ('1970). See also 
Ashford & Risinger, Presumptions, Assumptions, and Due Process in Criminal Cases: 
A Theoretical Overview, 79 YALE L.J. 165, 198-99 (1969). 
107. I am here using "provocation" as synonymous with "extreme emotional dis-
turbance." 
108. The traditional instruction for informing the jury of a statutory presumption 
tells the jury that it may, but is not compelled, to draw the inference. W. LAFAVB 
& A. Scorr, supra note 75, at 147-48. 
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fense, however, the jury can bail him out only by taking the more 
drastic measure of jury nullification.109 Thus, by requiring a higher 
standard of proof, affirmative defenses leave a defendant materially 
worse off than do presumptions. Accordingly, presumptions should 
be given less rather than more intense scrutiny by the courts.11° -
Furthermore, the proportionality doctrine should apply to pre-
sumptions as well as to affirmative defenses. If the punishment 
provided is not disproportionate in light -of the facts established by 
the state beyond a reasonable doubt, the ·use of an inference, however 
tenuous, to "establish" an additional fact should not impair the 
constitutionality of the statute defining the offense.111 Of course, 
if the inferred fact is essential to justify the prescribed punishment, 
the presumption must satisfy the due process test developed in the 
statutory presumption cases. The point is that this test is called for 
only if a prior eighth amendment analysis concludes that the fact in 
issue is a necessary part of the prosecution's case. 
The attempt to distinguish between the procedural practice of 
the Maine and New York law on provocation thus fails on a number 
of counts. First, it is entirely inapposite, since Maine law did not 
create a presumption. But, beyond that, it is analytically defective. 
As Patterson shows, the distinction is constitutionally significant only 
if one accepts the elements theory;112 Justice White c()ntended, in 
essence, that the distinction between the Maine and New York laws. 
was that absence of provocation was an element of one but not the 
other. 113 In addition, the distinction creates the anomalous result 
that the state can, in certain instances, shift to the defendant the per-
suasion burden with respect to a "nonessential" element but cannot 
take the less drastic course of shifting the production burden.114 
109. In contrast to the prerogative to decline an inference, juries are traditionally 
not alerted to their power to nullify. See, e.g., United States·v. Dougherty, 473 F.2d 
1113 (D.C. Cir. 1972). 
110. Scrutiny of presumptions is also required where improper instructions may 
confuse the jury by giving the impression that the presumption shifts the burden of 
persuasion. Where this occurs, the court need only review the instructions in light of 
the underlying statute and determine whether they meet the minimum standard of 
clarity. Poorly worded instructions should not be grounds for invalidating an other-
wise constitutional statute. 
111. This treatment of statutory presumptions is compatible with the concern for 
rationality in the criminal process. See note 60 infra. I am suggesting simply that 
for purposes of constitutional analysis statutory presumptions should be viewed as 
modified affirmative defenses. 
112. For a discussion of the shortcomings of the elements test, see text at notes 
68-74 supra. 
113. See text at notes 94-96 supra. 
114. Perhaps the Mullaney-Patterson distinction can be rationalized on the ground 
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One wonders why the Court struggled to construct such 
a spurious distinction. The most plausible explanation of the Court's 
behavior is that the Court recognized that it had erred in Mullaney 
and wished to rectify its mistake. Unfortunately, Mullaney was only 
two years old, and, to complicate matters, the decision was unani-
mous. These factors, plus a natural reluctance to confess error, no 
doubt sent the Court down the path it took. The only way the Court 
could simultaneously reject the reasoning of Mullaney without over-
ruling it was to write a revisionist history of the case and adopt an 
insupportable distinction between affirmative defenses and presump-
tions. 
It is unfortunate, in any event, that the Court lacked the candor 
to overrule Mullaney explicitly. It is unfortunate because Mullaney 
will likely linger on rather than die the quiet death it deserves. Al-
though I doubt that Mullaney will now be employed to invalidate 
affirmative defenses, 115 the case may come to stand for a rule of stat-
utory construction that not only has little to commend it but also has 
a significant potential for misapplication. The rule might emerge 
that if a criminal statute speaks in terms either of an implied element 
or of a presumption that must be rebutted, the courts will be war-
ranted in concluding that the fact "implied" or "presumed" is an "es-
sential element" of the crime, and thus part of the state's case.110 
Consequently, the statute will be analyzed from the perspective of 
that the intention of a legislature to impose a burden of persuasion on the defendartt 
must be clearly articulated. This would require the states to employ the correct lan-
guage in their statutes, which, I suppose, would be no great hardship. Cf. Bickel & • 
Wellington, Legislative Purpose and the Judicial Process: The Lincoln Mills Case, 
71 HARV. L. REV. 1 (1957) (the Supreme Court is sometimes justified in "remand-
ing" a statute to Congress to ensure that Congress meant what the statute seems to 
be saying). 
115. Ironically, on the same day it decided Patterson, the Court ruled that Mul-
laney had retroactive application. Hankerson v. North Carolina, 432 U.S. 233 
(1977). Significantly, the Court in Hankerson reserved the question whether due 
process allows the state to make self-defense an affirmative defense to murder. 432 
U.S. at 245. 
116. It is likely, but not certain, that the Court will persevere in imposing upon 
the states the distinction between statutory presumptions and affirmative defenses. 
Except for Mullaney, as interpreted by Patterson, the Court has never applied its 
more recent statutory presumption analysis to the states. While Patterson may 
herald a shift in this policy, quite possibly the Court will announce at some later 
date that Patterson overruled Mullaney, thereby aborting further development in this 
direction. See Israel, Gideon v. Wainwright: The "Art" of Overruling, 1963 SuP. 
Cr. REV. 211. Such an announcement would, by the way, be consistent with other 
Supreme Court forays into the states' substantive criminal law. The Court has on 
occasion made overtures to the effect that it would begin to consider various aspects 
of the substantive criminal law and then failed to come forth with serious develop-
ment. In this regard Mullaney and Patterson resemble the journey from Robinson 
v. _California, 370 U.S. 660 (1962), to Powell v. Texas, 392 U.S. 514 (1968). For 
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statutory presumptions rather than affirmative defenses.117 Not only 
might such a rule induce a court to repeat Patterson's erroneous con-
struotion of state law, but, by resurrecting the elements theory, it 
would make the constitutionality of a statute turn on semantics, and 
"[t]he reason for attaching constitutional significance to a semantic 
difference is [as] difficult to discern" in this area as it is in others.118 
IV. A FINAL THOUGHT 
The Supreme Court's treatment of burdens of proof in the last 
seven years has been, in many respects, a disturbing chapter in consti-
tutional jurisprudence. Winship, Mullaney, and Patterson are char-
acterized by misguided or misleading analysis, and although the Court 
reached correct results in the first and last cases, its modus operandi 
reflects poorly on the Court. Mullaney extended Winship's due pro-
cess theory further than careful analysis could sustain, in no small part 
because of some incautious language in Winship. Patterson restored 
Winship to its proper station by tacitly acknowledging, at least if my 
reading is correct, that the validity of an affirmative defense is gov-
erned by the eighth amendment's proportionality doctrine rather 
than by ithe due process analysis proposed in Winship. Patterson did, 
however, leave open the possibility of further confusion by suggest-
ing that Mullaney was correctly decided insofar as it differentiated 
between affirmative defenses and statutory presumptions. The 
irony of such an outcome is unmistakable, as Mullaney avowedly 
repudiated the concept that the validity of an affirmative defense 
rested on how the state chose to define an offense. One may hope 
that the Court will have an opportunity in the near future to resolve 
the remaining doubts about its position. 
a related point that also raises doubts as to whether statutory presumption analysis 
will be imposed on the states, see Allen, supra note 9, at 287 n.97. 
The states have generally felt bound by the Court's statutory presumption an-
alysis. See, e.g., People v. McClendon, 188 Colo. 140, 533 P.2d 923 (1975); State 
v. Searle, - La.-, 339 So. 2d 11194 (1976). 
117. In a situation where it is not clear whether a state meant to create an af-
firmative defense, where the eighth amendment analysis may be very difficult, and 
where statutory prest1mption analysis may be much simpler to apply, a court would 
be justified in resolving doubts in favor of statutory presumption analysis, assuming 
that the Mullaney-Patterson distinction is maintained. This approach would permit 
the court to postpone the more difficult constitutional question and would not pro-
hibit the state from replacing the presumption with an affirmative defense, should it 
choose to do so. 
118. Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady, 430 U.S. 274, 285 (1977). 
